FIRST
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE G.R.
Nos. 168188-89
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus
- YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DIVISION),
DOMINADOR
T. BELAC, NOE V. DANNANG,
JUAN M. BOGUEN and Promulgated:
THOMAS
B. TUBBAN, JR.,
Respondents. June 16, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Sandiganbayan acquitting the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 25391, 25392,
and 25393 for violation of Articles 171 and 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Antecedents
Dominador
T. Belac (then Provincial Governor of Kalinga) and Noe V. Dannang (then Provincial
Budget Officer) were charged with falsification of an official document as defined
in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about 03 September 1998,
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tabuk, Province
of Kalinga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, both public officers, accused Dominador T. Belac,
being then the Provincial Governor, and accused Noe V. Dannang, being the
Provincial Budget Officer of the Province of Kalinga, respectively, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of their official functions, and mutually conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously falsify the Advice of Allotment dated 03 September 1998 by making it
appear that the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00)
was appropriated under Appropriation Ordinance No. 97-04 for payment of
equipment, when, in truth and in fact, no such appropriation ordinance was
passed for the payment of equipment and the aforesaid Appropriation Ordinance
No. 97-04 which was indicated therein pertains to “An Ordinance Providing for
the Salaries of Officials and Personnels (sic)
of the Province of Kalinga for the Period of January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998,
and for other purposes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25391.
The said accused, together with Juan
M. Boguen (then Provincial Treasurer of Kalinga) and Thomas B. Tubban, Jr. (Officer-In-Charge
of the Office of the Provincial Accountant), were charged with technical
malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
That on or about 04 September 1998,
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tabuk, Province
of Kalinga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused: Dominador T. Belac, then Provincial Governor; Juan M.
Boguen, then Provincial Treasurer; Noe V. Dannang, then Provincial Budget
Officer, and Thomas B. Tubban, Jr., then OIC Office of the Provincial
Accountant, respectively (sic), all
of the Provincial Capitol of Kalinga, while in the performance of their
official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, taking
advantage of their official positions, conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously divert and
apply General Fund 1011 of the Provincial Government of Kalinga which was under
their administration to some purpose or use other than that provided by law, by
purchasing or approving to purchase Nissan Safari Vehicle amounting to ONE
MILLION SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN PESOS/SEVENTY
CENTS (P1,076,127.70) as evidenced by Check No. 126591 dated 04
September 1998 and corresponding voucher therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
This case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 25392.
These four officials were also charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about 04 September 1998,
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Kalinga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused: Dominador T. Belac, then Provincial Governor; Juan M.
Boguen, then Provincial Treasurer; Noe V. Dannang, then Provincial Budget
Officer, and Thomas B. Tubban, Jr., then OIC, Office of the Provincial
Accountant, respectively (sic), all
of the Provincial Capitol of Kalinga, committing the crime (offense) herein
charged in relation to and taking advantage of their official functions,
conspiring and confederating with each other, and through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the approval and subsequent release
of the amount of ONE MILLION SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS AND ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY-SEVEN PESOS/SEVENTY CENTS (P1,076,127.70) (sic) Philippine currency, as partial payment of the NISSAN SAFARI
vehicle of the Provincial Governor purchased from ROYCE MOTOR CENTER, INC. said
accused knowing fully well that said approval and release had no corresponding
appropriation or resolution by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, thus causing undue injury to the Provincial Government of
Kalinga in the amount aforestated and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage,
or preference in favor of ROYCE MOTOR CENTER, INC.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25393.
The trial of the three cases was consolidated. During pre-trial, the prosecution and the accused
stipulated on the following:
The parties have agreed that the
purchase of the motor vehicle in question herein has been regular in all
aspects insofar as the mechanical procedures for the purchase of the motor
vehicle is concerned, including the fact that the vehicle itself is registered
in the name of the Province of Kalinga. The only issue is whether or not the funds
used to purchase the motor vehicle subject matter of the accusation herein was
authorized by the Provincial Board of the existing fund of the Provincial
Government of Kalinga in 1998.[5]
The parties also agreed, “without
prejudice to whatever other action the accused might take on the earlier
cancellation [by the court] of the last sentence of the first paragraph on page
2 of the Pre-Trial Order dated September 22, 1999,” to dispense with the
testimony of Vice-Governor Jocel Baac and that of Provincial Secretary James
Alunday, upon the following stipulation of facts:
1) The Vice-Governor would have testified that, outside of the resolutions stipulated upon in the “Stipulation of Documents” dated October 19, 1999, no other written resolutions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exists with respect to the purchase of the Nissan Safari motor vehicle by the Province of Kalinga. x x x
2) The
Provincial Secretary would have testified as to the meaning of the text in the
minutes of the meeting of
The Antecedents
When Dominador T. Belac assumed
office on P1,585,000.00,
with a downpayment of P600,000.00, the balance to be payable in 12 monthly
installments of P130,000.00, without interest. Belac paid the P600,000.00 downpayment using
his personal check. However, Royce Motor
later required him to pay the balance in six (6) monthly installments of P164,000.00
each, the first installment to be due on
Belac thereafter requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to realign P200,000.00 from the roads and bridges fund of the Office
of the Provincial Engineer so that the first installment of P164,000.00 could
be paid. The request was referred to the Committee on Finance and Appropriation
(CFA) headed by Sanggunian member
William Puday.
During
the session of the Sanggunian on
What transpired on September 2, 3 and
4, 1998, is the bone of contention between petitioner, on the one hand, and
respondents, on the other.
CFA Chairman William Puday and
members Andres B. Ngao-l, Ruben Tuazon, and Richard Abadilla were one in
claiming that the Sanggunian and the
CFA did not meet on September 2 and 3, 1998, but held
only “informal meetings” in the Office of Victor Tanggawon, Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Vice-Governor and also a Sanggunian
member. The four Sanggunian members declared, inter
alia, that they were in Tanggawon’s office on
After lunch, Puday went to the DBP
Tabuk Branch and conferred with Pacita T. Castillo and Cashier Rodolfo Supnet. He invited them to attend the CFA meeting at P1,500,000.00 loan would be processed and
released immediately as soon as the following requirements were in order: (1)
Resolution from the Sanggunian
authorizing the treasurer and the governor to undertake a deposit and borrow
from the DBP; and (2) the opening of a special credit deposit account. After the conference, the CFA members present
resolved to recommend to the Sanggunian
the following options during its September 7, 1998 session: (1) to open a
credit account deposit under the name of the Province with the DBP with an
initial deposit of P2,000,000.00; (2) to authorize Belac to secure a P1,500,000.00 loan
with DBP; and (3) to realign the amount of P200,000.00 from any service
to augment the monthly installments due on August 6, 1998. However, no formal resolution was approved by
the CFA.
Momentarily, Provincial Treasurer
Juan M. Boguen arrived with Gumiran and Wilfredo Tacod, the Sales
Representative and the Manager of Royce Motor Center, Inc., respectively. Boguen introduced Gumiran and Tacod who
informed the CFA members about the terms of payment, which included a P93,400.00
discount if the balance would be paid in cash.
After the briefing, Boguen and Tacod left, and later returned with a
check in payment of the balance of the purchase price, which Boguen turned over
to Gumiran and Tacod. Although surprised
at the development, the CFA members did not object to the remittance of the
check to Gumiran and Tacod. Puday
rendered a report which was incorporated in the minutes of the meeting.
In contrast, Rodolfo Supnet, the Cashier
of the DBP Tabuk Branch, declared that Sanggunian
members Puday and Ngao-l meet with him and Pacita T. Castillo, another bank
employee, and asked about the requirements of a bank loan. He informed Puday that the loan application would
be processed and the proceeds released upon the opening of a special credit
deposit account with an initial deposit of P2,500,600.00 and a
resolution of the Sanggunian
authorizing the loan by the Province.
Puday assured him that the requisite resolution would be approved the
next day.
According to Noe V. Dannang, the
Provincial Budget Officer, he saw Supnet along the Session Hall of the Sanggunian in the Provincial Capitol in the
afternoon of
Dannang further declared that, the next day,
September 3, 1998, he attended an informal conference upon the invitation of Sanggunian
member Ngao-l in the Office of the
Acting Vice-Governor Victor Tanggawon with Sanggunian
members Puday, Tuazon, Abadilla, Wagaso, Donqui-is, and Ex-Officio member Froilan Belac.
Also in attendance was Provincial Treasurer Juan M. Boguen who was instructed
by Ngao-l to prepare an advice allotment for the purchase of the governor’s
service vehicle. He assured Dannang that the resolution authorizing the loan of
the province from the DBP would be formalized and authorized by the Sanggunian during its
Boguen
testified that, at about P1,109,410.00
for the vehicle that day, net of the P600,000.00 earlier paid by Belac,
they would get a P93,400.00 discount.
The Sanggunian members then
ordered Boguen to prepare the check for the amount due. Boguen went to Belac’s office and instructed
one of the latter’s clerks to prepare a Purchase Request, Voucher and Release
of Allotment (ROA). Belac signed the
documents and transmitted them to Thomas Tubban, Jr., the Officer-in-Charge of
the Office of the Provincial Accountant, who was informed that there was
already an advice of allotment and a request therefor. Tubban then signed the request for allotment
and certified in the disbursement voucher that adequate funds were available. The papers were returned to Boguen who
prepared and signed the check for P1,076,127.70, net of 4% tax
(P33,282.30). Belac also affixed
his signature on the document. Boguen
then brought the check to Gumiran and to the Sanggunian members in the Office of the Acting Vice-Governor. Gumiran issued a receipt and told Boguen that
the Sanggunian members wanted to get
the P93,400.00 discount. However,
Boguen refused, insisting that “the discount should go to the province and not
to the Sanggunian members.”
During
the session of the Sanggunian on
September 4, 1998, the CFA submitted the following recommendation on Belac’s
request for authority to secure a loan: (1) to authorize the Provincial
Treasurer to open a treasury account in the amount of P2.5 million at the
DBP Tabuk Branch; (2) to authorize Governor Belac to secure a P1.5
million loan from DBP to pay the service vehicle; and (3) to realign P200,000.00
from any available source to augment the proposed loan to cover the
registration of the vehicle and other expenses to complete the purchase.[10] However, the Sanggunian rejected the recommendation on the following grounds:
(1) the balance of the purchase price of the vehicle had already been paid; (2)
the vehicle was not yet owned by the province; and (3) the vehicle was not an income-generating
equipment. An administrative complaint
was thereafter filed against Boguen, Tubbon, Jr., Dannang and Belac.[11]
When he testified for the prosecution,
Provincial Auditor Dionisio Bernal declared that he conducted an investigation
of the payment of the vehicle and found that the transaction lacked the
following supporting documents: 1) exemption/clearance on the prohibition of
Administrative Order No. 101 of the Office of the President; 2) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution appropriating
an amount for the purpose; 3) Price Quotation of dealers and abstract of proposals
or proof showing that no dealers offered the same item and quality at lower
price; 4) Certificate of Award; 5) Sales Invoice with complete list of car
accessories; and 6) Certificate of Warranty. He then issued a notice of suspension to the Provincial
Governor, the Office
of the Provincial Accountant, and the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, to
suspend the liquidation of the amount disbursed.[12] He required Belac to submit his explanation as
well as furnish copies of the original receipt.[13] Belac submitted an explanation but failed to
submit the required documents, particularly the Appropriation Ordinance, the
exemption or clearance and the Certificate of Award.
In
the course of his review, Bernal came across the request for obligation of
allotment with account code “Allotment plus 4-36” with the entry “Appropriation
Ordinance No. 97-04” written thereon. He
stated that the said ordinance, the budget ordinance for 1998, covered not only
the salaries of officials and provincial personnel but also other purposes. Bernal stated that the entry “97-04” in the
advice of allotment was a correct entry, meaning that there is an appropriation
for the purchase indicated in the Advice of Allotment as found in Ordinance
97-04 except “(a)s for the object of expenditures, it does not appear in the
Appropriation Ordinance”; and that Appropriation Ordinance 97-04 was not the
correct ordinance from which the amount was taken because there was no
appropriation therein for the transaction.[14]
Bernal
testified further that, in October 1999, he was given a copy of Appropriation
Ordinance No. 99-03 entitled “An Ordinance Enacting the Annual Budget for the
Province of Kalinga for Calendar Year 1999 Providing Funds for the Operations
Thereof,” whereby the Province of Kalinga had a total budget of P189,552,261.00
for 1999, with a total capital outlay of P1,011,000.00, and an
unappropriated surplus of P1,991,102.00. The “Program Appropriation and
Obligation by Object, General Fund 1011,” which was the general fund for the Office
of the Governor, did not contain any appropriation for capital outlay that
included the motor vehicle.[15]
After
trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment acquitting all the accused of the
crimes charged. It gave credence and
probative weight to the following explanation of Dannang: he prepared the
advice of allotment as instructed by Sanggunian
member Ngao-l during the meeting of September
3, 1998 because it was agreed that the Sanggunian
would adopt a Resolution on September 7, 1998 formally authorizing the governor
to obtain a loan from the DBP in the name of the province; he then returned to
his office and had one of his staff members prepare the advice of allotment on
the Standard Allotment Form already encoded in the office computer; and nobody
typed the entry “97-04” appearing under the column for the appropriation
ordinance number contained in the advice of allotment because that entry was
already stored in the computer.
According to the anti-graft court, this was the appropriation ordinance
of the
According
to the Sandiganbayan, Dannang’s explanation was not far-fetched and was, in
fact, reasonable. The entry “97-04” was
clearly an ordinary mistake that often befalls the bureaucracy due to reliance
on templates embedded in computer software, intended to ensure speed and
convenience in the preparation of frequently-used forms and documents, in this
case, the advise of allotment. No malice
can be inferred from the entry since neither Dannang nor Governor Belac stood to
profit from the error. The anti-graft court
believed that Dannang did not notice the error because all entries were to him
routinary and error-free, de kahon, and
also because he had trusted his personnel.
The
Sandiganbayan also ruled that the intent to gain or to injure another is
unnecessary to commit the felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
for what is punished is the violation of public faith and the perversion of the
truth in the documents solemnly proclaimed.
The felony, being malum in se,
requires malice; hence, good faith, or the absence of malice or bad faith,
prevents incipient criminality from arising.
The anti-graft court cited cases where this Court held that good faith
is a valid defense for it negates criminal intent on the part of the accused.
The
Sandiganbayan absolved Belac, declaring that if Dannang had no criminal intent
due to his good faith, then Belac should not be treated differently since it
was the former and not the latter who had been responsible for the preparation
of the advise of allotment. It acquitted
the accused of technical malversation, on its finding that the responsible
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Kalinga, particularly of the CFA, namely, Tanggawon, Ngao-l, Tuazon, and
Puday, their convenient assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, had
themselves expressly ordered and authorized the preparation of the check that
was to be delivered to Gumiran (salesman/representative of Royce Motor), in
payment for the balance on the purchase price of the vehicle. At the time of the delivery, the accused were
acting upon the assurance of said Sanggunian
members that the necessary appropriation ordinance would be adopted on
made assurances that the resolution would be passed by
The
Sandiganbayan also ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of all
the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Aside from assurances that the said
resolution would be adopted by P1,076,127.00 did not give Royce Motor any unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference.
Royce Motor was the same seller that had previously sold the vehicles
that the
The
anti-graft court thus found that the accused were not actuated by evident bad
faith. It likewise ruled that the prosecution
failed to prove that gross inexcusable negligence was attendant to the act
complained of, since they acted in good faith in preparing the check and
delivering the same to Royce Motor, particularly as the same was made in
compliance with the order of the Sanggunian
members.[16]
Outraged
by the acquittal of all the accused, the People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, sought relief from this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted contrary to law
and applicable jurisprudence and with grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in acquitting all the accused of all the charges,
considering that proof beyond reasonable doubt had been adduced to prove the
guilt of the accused for all the crimes charged.[17]
The
People justifies its plea for the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan,
on its claim that Appropriation Ordinance No. 97-04, on which the Advice of
Allotment dated September 3, 1998 bases its support, is not for expenditures of
the Office of the Provincial Governor for executive services or for the payment
of equipment. Rather, it was earmarked
for the salaries of officials and personnel of the
Petitioner
asserts that its evidence shows that the Sanggunian
never appropriated the sum of P1,076,127.70. Respondents could not find solace in the
August 24, 1998 Sanggunian
proceedings because respondents Boguen and Dannang were ordered to merely
consult with the local banks for a possible loan by the governor, which request
was referred to the CFA and the Committee on General Services.
Petitioner avers that the culpability
of respondents for technical malversation can be seen from their certifications
and signatures on the Advice of Allotment and Disbursement voucher which were
used to settle the payment for the Nissan Safari vehicle. Respondent Dannang was the one who prepared
the Advice of Allotment, and certified in the Request for Obligation of
Allotment as to the existence of appropriations
for the expenditure and the amount thereof; respondent Boguen was the one who
certified as to the availability of funds therein and signed the Land Bank
Check; respondent Tubban was the one who signed in behalf of Provincial
Accountant Virginia U. Puyoc in the Disbursement Voucher, who certified that there
was “adequate available funds/budgetary allotment, expenditure properly
certified and supported by document and account codes proper”; and respondent Belac
was the one who signed all the said documents including the purchase request,
purchase order, and inspection report. Hence,
petitioner contends, there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent when it merely brushed aside the presence of all the elements of
technical malversation in this case, and ruled that respondents merely acted in
good faith when they paid in full the purchase price of the subject vehicle.
Petitioner
maintains that the good faith of respondent is, likewise, negated by the fact
that the Advice of Allotment dated P1,500,000.00
was appropriated under Appropriation Ordinance No. 97-04 for the payment of the
subject vehicle, when no such appropriation ordinance was passed for the purpose.
Respondent Dannang, who recommended the approval of the advice of allotment,
and respondent Belac, who approved the same, do not deny their signatures
thereon; hence, they are clearly liable for falsification of a public or
official document.
Petitioner
further asserts that the Provincial Government of Kalinga suffered undue injury
in the amount of P1,076,127.70, representing funds intended for the
payment of the salaries of officials and employees, maintenance and other
operating expenses of the Provincial Government of Kalinga, as the said fund
was unduly diverted to finance the purchase of respondent Belac’s Nissan Safari
vehicle. Bad faith on the part of respondents
was clearly evident when they immediately prepared the voucher and handed the
payment of the purchase price to the Royce Motor representative even if they
knew that no corresponding appropriation ordinance had yet been issued by the Sanggunian for that purpose. The intent to defraud can, likewise, be
gleaned from respondents’ use of the Advice of Allotment dated P1,500,000.00 was appropriated under
Appropriation Ordinance No. 97-04.[18]
Petitioner
prays (1) that the decision of the Sandiganbayan be reversed; (2) that another
judgment be rendered finding all private respondents guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged; and (3) that they be sentenced accordingly.
For
their part, private respondents aver that, although petitioner states that its petition
was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it is, in fact, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in which
questions of fact are raised. In any
event, respondents insist, the petition should be dismissed outright since the
judgment of the Sandiganbayan acquitting them of all the charges can no longer
be reversed or even modified on appeal under Rule 45 or even in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without placing
them in double jeopardy.
In reply, petitioner avers that, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in petitions
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in order to resolve the legal issues, such
as where there was palpable error or grave abuse or misapplication of facts by
the lower court. It also insists that a
judgment of acquittal may be reversed without violating the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy on the ground that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.[19]
The
petition has no merit.
As
gleaned from the material averments in the petition as well as in the other pleadings
of petitioner, the present action appears to be one under both Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, the prosecution cannot simultaneously
avail of the remedies of a special civil action for certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in civil cases.[20] A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are two and separate remedies. A
petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65
covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45.[21] A petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under
Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final order of
the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court:
Section 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court, or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
However,
the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order “unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy.” The judgment that may be appealed by the
aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a
judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such
judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section
21, Article III of the Constitution provides that “no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” The rule is that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that
accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in
double jeopardy.[22] Such acquittal is final and unappealable on
the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on
appeal at the CA.[23] Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing
the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The early development of the
principle can be traced through a variety of sources ranging from legal maxims
to casual references in contemporary commentary. Although the form and breadth of the prohibition
varied widely, the underlying premise was generally that a defendant should not
be twice tried or punished for the same offense.[24] Writing in the 17th century, Lord Coke
described the protection afforded by the principle of double jeopardy as a function
of three related common-law pleas: autrefois
acquit, autrefois convict, and
pardon. Blackstone later used the
ancient term “jeopardy” to characterize the principle underlying the two pleas
of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. He stated that the principle was a “universal
maxim of the common law of
In
criminal law, the principle is expressed in the Latin maxim: “Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto,” or,
as Coke says, “Nemo debet bis puniri pro
uno delicto” (No one can be twice punished for the same crime or
misdemeanor). The United States Supreme
Court declared that at the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting
the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same
offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the
State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.[26] Society’s awareness of the heavy personal
strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal
laws.[27]
The
policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the government
to appeal after a verdict of acquittal.
Granting such broad appeal rights to the government would allow the
prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of defendant’s guilt
after having failed with the first; it would permit him to re-examine the
weaknesses in his first presentation in order to strengthen the second; and it
would disserve the defendant’s legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict
of acquittal.[28] The underlying idea is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty. Thus,
the State is prevented from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its
evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly
burden defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental
perseverance.[29] For
this reason, when a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has
failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction.
When a defendant has been acquitted
of an offense, the clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict him, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.[30]
Thus,
it is one of the elemental principles of criminal law that the government
cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may
appear to be erroneous.[31] That judgment of acquittal, however erroneous,
bars further prosecution on any aspect of the count, and consequently, bars
appellate review of the trial court’s error.[32] Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction is shown, the errors committed by the trial court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, or even the legal soundness of such decision,
errors of judgment, mistakes in its findings and conclusions, are not proper subjects
of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[33]
An
acquittal represents the factfinder’s conclusion that, under the controlling
legal principles, the evidence does not establish that defendant can be
convicted of the offense charged in the indictment. An acquittal is a resolution, correct or not,
some or all of the factual elements of the crime charged. For a ruling to be considered a functional
acquittal, it must speak of the factual innocence of the accused.[34] However, the judgment does not necessarily
establish the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal culpability. The acquittal may result from erroneous
evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations governing legal principles introduced
by the defense, yet the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal.[35]
One
other reason why further prosecution is barred to appeal an acquittal is that
the government has already been afforded one complete opportunity to prove a
case of the criminal defendant’s culpability and, when it has failed for any
reason to persuade the court not to enter a final judgment favorable to the
accused, the constitutional policies underlying the ban against multiple trials
become compelling. It matters not
whether the final judgment constitutes a formal “acquittal.” What is critical is whether the accused
obtained, after jeopardy attached, a favorable termination of the charges against
him. If he did, no matter how erroneous
the ruling, the policies embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause require the
conclusion that further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues
on the elements of the offense charged are barred.[36]
The
public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an
acquitted defendant may not be retried even though the acquittal was based upon
an egregiously erroneous foundation. If
the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment
becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant’s
valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Consequently, as a general rule, the
prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused
to stand trial.[37] The reason is not that the first trial
established the defendant’s factual innocence, but rather that the second trial
would present all the untoward consequences that the clause was designed to
prevent. The government would be allowed
to seek to persuade a second trier of the fact of the defendant’s guilt, to
strengthen any weaknesses in its first presentation, and to subject the defendant
to the expense and anxiety of a second trial.[38]
In
the present case, the only errors ascribed by petitioner to the Sandiganbayan
pertained to alleged errors in its appreciation of the evidence on record, and the
probative weight and the sufficiency thereof to prove the elements of the crime
charged, such as whether respondents acted in good or bad faith, or whether the
State sustained injury or damage while acting in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
erred in its factual findings and its conclusion that the evidence of the
People did not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt of guilt of respondents
of the crimes charged, such findings and conclusion cannot be the subject for
review in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the
accused against double jeopardy would be violated.[39]
A
judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened
to establish that the court a quo, in
this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. No grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said
evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.[40]
In this case, the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
The People had its day in court and adduced its evidence. There was no collusion between the prosecutor
and respondents. The anti-graft court extensively
analyzed the evidence of the parties and made its findings and conclusions
based thereon. Assuming that any error
was committed in the Sandiganbayan’s review of the evidence and the records,
such errors are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado, with Associate Justices Teresita L. Leonardo-De Castro (Presiding Justice) and Diosdado M. Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 92-132.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 13-14.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
The balance, amounting to P1,109,410.00, included comprehensive
insurance (P60,000.00), dual airconditioning (P25,000.00), and
interest (P39,410.00).
[8] Rollo, p. 122.
[9] Appropriation Ordinance 97-04 was the
ordinance providing for the salaries of officials and personnel of the Province
for the period from
[10] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] 331 Phil. 531 (1996).
[20] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
103613,
[21] People v. Court of Appeals, 438 Phil.
215, 231 (2002).
[22] Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1568,
[23] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
142051,
[24] 340 J.
Sigler, Double Jeopardy 2-16 (1969).
[25] Green v. U.S., 355
[26] Green v.
[27]
[28]
[29]
See Green v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 449
[30] Green v. U.S., supra.
[31]
[32] U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
[33] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note
22, at 613; People v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 20, at 475; Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company v. Veridiano, 412 Phil. 795, 803 (2001); People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000); People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil.
164, 180-181 (1999).
[34] Scott v.
[35]
[36] U.S. v. Jenkins, 420
[37]
[38]
[39] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note
22, at 614.
[40] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note
32, at 181.